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FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN
PROPERTY CATASTROPHE
REINSURANCE:
THE CONVERGENCE OF
INSURANCE AND CAPITAL
MARKETS
by-Graciela. Chichilnisky, Ph.D. 1
Columbia University
The property catastrophe reinsurance industry
faces a major challenge . Since 1989, climatic
volatility has produced unprecedented insured
losses of $43 billion, $18 billion of which
were from Hurricane Andrew alone . A surge
of insurer defaults and dramatic changes in
capacity and pricing have followed in their
wake.
Catastrophic risks must be addressed with in-
novative financial approaches that bring the
insurance industry closer to the securities in-
dustry. This article discusses the new financial
instruments that can be successfully used to
hedge unknown catastrophe risks.
'The author acknowledges information provided by Pe-
ter Vloedman, Columbia Business School .
Hurricane Andrew Changed It All
In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused an
unprecedented level of destruction . With in-
sured losses of more than $18 billion and to-
tal losses greater than $25 billion, Andrew
was the most devastating natural catastrophe
ever recorded . It has also led to a wave of fi-
nancial catastrophe: the hurricane affected al-
most every major insurance company in the
United States . No matter how hard reinsurers
tried to diversify their portfolios among differ-
ent insurance companies, they sustained loss-
es on virtually every account that they had
underwritten .
Reinsurers Depart
The magnitude of these losses contributed to
the demise of numerous reinsurers . In the
year following Andrew, 38 non-U.S . and 8
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U.S . reinsurers, with familiar names such as
Continental Re and New England Re, either
withdrew from the reinsurance business com-
pletely or ceased underwriting catastrophe re-
insurance . Moreover, in the late 1980s to
mid-1993, more than 200 reinsurers left the
marketplace, citing intense competition, re-
serve strengthening due to asbestos and envi-
ronmental losses, and prior natural catastro-
phes (such as the 1990 European windstorms
and Hurricane Hugo) as reasons for their de-
parture.
Capacity Constraints
The departure of reinsurers caused catastro-
phe reinsurance capacity to drop by more
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than 30 percent between 1989 and 1993-
over 20 percent of which occurred between
1992 and 1993 and was due to Hurricane
Andrew. In 1989, the average U.S . catastro-
phe reinsurance program was -approximately
$144.3 million . But by January 1993, imme-
diately after Andrew, the average program ca-
pacity had plummeted to $93.7 million. Insur-
ance companies could not buy enough
catastrophe reinsurance-no matter how
much they were willing to pay. The worldwide
catastrophe reinsurance demand exceeded
the supply. This is illustrated by Figure 1 .
FIGURE 1
PROPERTY CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE
CAPACITY: A HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF
PLACEMENT SHORTFALL PERCENTAGE
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Composite of 14 programs placed by Guy
Carpenter 8c Co., Inc .
'Shortfall is the difference between the amount of
coverage desired and the amount of coverage
available in the market .
Prices Rise
Between 1989 and 1994, the contraction of
capacity caused reinsurance prices to rise al-
continued on page 3
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most 70 percent: from 12.4 percent rate on
line to 20.7 percent rate on line, much of it
as a result of Andrew. (Rate on line is the
price charged per dollar of coverage pur-
chased.) This is illustrated in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2
PROPERTY CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE
CAPACITY : A HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF
PROGRAM RATE ON LINE
Program Rate on Line*
1689 1680 1881 1882 1683 1984
Composite of 14 programs placed by Guy
Carpenter & Co., Inc.
'Rate on line is the price charged per dollar of
coverage purchased .
Bermuda Emerges
The decrease in catastrophe reinsurance sup-
ply following Andrew led to changes in the
marketplace. With the continuing doubts over
the future existence of Lloyd's of London and
the need for capacity, Bermuda has become a
major force in the property catastrophe reinsur-
ance market . In a period of 1 1/2 years, $4
billion of capital was infused into Bermuda
companies formed for the purpose of writing
property catastrophe business . These new enti-
ties included Centre Cat, Global Capital Re, In-
ternational Property Catastrophe Re, La Salle
Re, Mid Ocean Re, Renaissance Re, Partner Re,
-and Tempest -Re. Interestingly, investors in
those companies comprised major players in
the securities industry, such as Morgan Stan-
ley, Goldman Sachs, J .P Morgan, and Warburg
Pincus . This combination indicates the interest
of the securities industry in the high margin re-
insurance business. It anticipates the combined
use of insurance and security instruments as a
means of hedging property catastrophe risks.
The Effect upon Worldwide Capacity
The emergence of the Bermuda market is re-
sponsible for more than 80 percent of the 35
percent increase in worldwide reinsurance ca-
pacity from 1993 to 1994. Bermuda has
gone from comprising less than 1 percent of
the catastrophe reinsurance market to 25 per-
cent in 5 years. -In contrast, U.K . capacity
dropped about 60 percent during the same
period . In 1994, the Bermuda companies av-
eraged a combined operating profit ratio of
40 percent, which translated into an average
15 percent return on equity ; an excellent re-
turn in a year that witnessed almost $19 bil-
lion i n worldwide catastrophe losses . These
changes in reinsurance market share are de-
picted in Figure 3.
Problems in Predicting
Catastrophic Risks
The practical problem for the reinsurance in-
dustry is that catastrophic risks have reached
record values . Currently, reinsurers face two
difficulties in underwriting such coverage : vol-
atile climatic conditions and the inapplicability
of the law of large numbers in predicting ca-
tastrophe losses .
continued on page 4
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PROPERTY CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE CAPACITY :
A HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF MARKET SHARE BY REGION
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Climatic Conditions
In recent years, the increase in weather volatil-
ity has heightened the difficulty in predicting
catastrophic property losses, rendering stan-
dard actuarial tables unreliable . Such climate
volatility is often associated with global cli-
mate change. This is blamed by some on the
emission of greenhouse gases into the planet's
atmosphere by Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries,
the group of the world's most industrialized na-
tions . If so, volatility is only going to increase .
The problem is not likely to go away.
As climate becomes more volatile, actuarial
tables have become unreliable, creating the
risk of using the wrong table for predictive
purposes. For example, one table could pre-
dict five hurricanes over a 5-year period, with
average strength and associated loss of $3
billion each. Another, equally reliable, table
could predict 10 hurricanes during the same
period, having losses of about $2 billion each.
Although one can take an average of the two
source's opinions in creating a new actuarial
table, this does not work in actual practice . If
both scenarios are equally plausible, for exam-
ple, then taking the average guarantees that,
most of the time, the exposure to risks will ei-
ther be overinsured or underinsured. Both
lead to costly risks . The former leads to finan-
cial losses since insurance is expensive. Un-
derinsurance is even more costly ; underinsur-
ance leads to financial risks of default . In
continued on page 5
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either case, to the physical catastrophe one
may add financial catastrophe. This happened
to many reinsurers on the eve of Andrew. It
also happened with Lloyd's of London, where
underestimation of climate losses has led to
continuing doubts about its future existence.
Inapplicability of the Law of Large Numbers
The second problem associated with predict-
ing the incidence of catastrophic property loss
is that insurance does not work very well un-
der these circumstances. The law of large
numbers requires that risks be "independent,"
behaving, for example, as car accidents or fire
hazards . These conditions produce reliable ac-
tuarial tables, which form the scientific foun-
dation for pricing in the insurance industry.
However, when large-scale catastrophic prop-
erty losses occur, risks are no longer indepen-
dent because a hurricane affecting one insur-
er will also affect every other insurer writing
coverage in the same geographical area .
In effect, catastrophic property losses are
highly correlated risks-as opposed to being
independent risks . And since large-scale prop-
erty catastrophes impact a significant_ part of
the insurer population both in physical and in
financial terms, the law of large numbers
does not operate under these circumstances,
making it impossible for reinsurers to diversify
risks . What can be done?
Catastrophe Bundles:
A Tool for Hedging Risks
In response to this problem, the insurance in-
dustry has begun to adopt innovative solutions.
Reinsurers can deal with the correlated risks
posed by property catastrophes using a 'catas-
trophe bundle,"2 introduced at the program on
2See A.M. Bests's Review, March 1996, p. 45 .
Information and Resources at Columbia Univer-
sity (copyright 1995). A catastrophe bundle is
a two-part contract which combines a catastro-
phe future with a mutual reinsurance portfolio.
Catastrophe bundles permit reinsurers to pro-
vide full, customized coverage to an insurer
without having it assume unreasonable risk.
Catastrophe Futures
The first component of a catastrophe bundle
treats the actuarial table as the risk. i.e ., the
risk of using the wrong actual table for predict-
ing the frequency of property catastrophes . Se-
curities similar to those suggested in 1992 are
now traded on both the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT) under the name _ "CAT" (catastro-
phe) futures as well as in private sales. A CAT
future entitles the reinsurer to an agreed dollar
amount that increases as the frequency of ca-
tastrophe claims in a given region increases.
Since the value of CAT contracts rises as losses
increase, reinsurers decrease their exposures by
buying such instruments . On the other side of
the equation, speculators can trade CAT con-
tracts to make a profit, in effect providing them
with a means of betting on the weather.
The Mutual Reinsurance Portfolio
In addition to the protection provided by catas-
trophe futures if catastrophe frequency rises,
reinsurers also require additional protection if
the severity of catastrophes exceeds their pre-
dictions . This, in turn, is afforded by the sec-
ond part of a catastrophe bundle : a mutual re-
insurance portfolio. The mutual reinsurance
portfolio provides shares in a CAT pool and is
designed to cover deviations from the average
severity exposure posed by catastrophes .
3See, for example, G. Chichilnisky and'G. Heal, "Global
Environmental Risks,' Economic Perspectives, October
1993, and G. Chichilnisky, "How To Hedge Unknown
Risks, A.M. Best's Review, March 1996.
continued on page 6
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This combination of catastrophe futures and a
mutual reinsurance portfolio can be meshed
to provide reinsurers with a very effective
means of hedging property catastrophe risks,
ultimately producing an optimal allocation of
risk bearing between reinsurers seeking to
hedge their risks, and speculators who seek a
profit from the transaction . The mathematical
formulas required to implement a catastrophe
bundle can be provided by consultants at the
Program on Information and Resources at Co-
lumbia University and are customized accord-
ing to each reinsuress individual situation . Al-
though other hedging instruments are
possible, catastrophe bundles are straightfor-
ward and relatively easy to execute and trade .
Negative Correlations
In contrast to insurance, catastrophe bundles
are not based solely on either the law of large
numbers or on the pooling of risk. Rather, they
involve the use of negative correlations (in the
case of catastrophe futures), together with risk
pooling (as respects the mutual reinsurance
portfolio). The principle of negative correlations
is one with which the securities industry is fa-
miliar but the insurance industry is not . For ex-
ample, when there is an earthquake, those
who are affected are affected differently. The
homeowner loses from the earthquake but the
construction industry gains . Thus, by buying
enough shares in the construction industry,
one can hedge the risk of losing one's home.
The point is that it does not matter who suf-
fers the risk. Everyone does. There is no risk
pooling when using negative correlations .
Rather, negative correlations allow reinsurers to
hedge risks by buying catastrophe futures .
Catastrophe-Linked Bonds
Banfield Ellinger, a London-based reinsurance
broker, has recently pioneered a product simi-
The Future of the Industry
continued on page 7
Page 6 RISK FINANCING NEWSLETTER Vol. 13 No. 2
lar to catastrophe bundles . It joined with AIG
Combined Risks (AIGCR), the investment bank-
ing arm of American International Group, to
place a portfolio of catastrophe-linked bonds
with a U.K. manager. The fund manager is in-
vesting about $10 million with an offshore
special vehicle which will sell a loss warranty
reinsurance contract to reinsurance companies .
The policy is triggered if catastrophic insurance
losses in one of five geographical areas-the
United States, Japan, Australia, the Caribbean,
and Western Europe-exceed a level stipulated
in the contract . Losses are measured against
the industry loss indexes of Property Claims
Services . M. Matthew Harding, the chairman
of Banfield, calls this a "groundbreaking prod-
uct which accesses a new source of capital
for the reinsurance industry."4
Solving the problem of hedging unknown cata-
strophic risks requires a blend of skills from
the securities and insurance industries . By tap-
ping capital markets, reinsurers will be better
able to deal with correlated, catastrophic risks .
The size of the derivative securities markets is
a great plus : with about $3 billion traded per
day, this market avoids the major difficulty of
"thin" markets in which prices turn against the
reinsurer after a catastrophe, precisely when
capital is needed most. Because the deriva-
tives market is both large and liquid, when a
number of reinsurers go to the market to bor-
row after a catastrophe, it will not turn against
them, thus affording reinsurers a source of
funds even when demand is high. The Fields
Institute of Mathematical Sciences conducted
a workshop in June in Toronto, during which
industry players and scientific researchers
4See R. Lapper, 'Catastrophe insurance loss bonds pio-
neered,' Financial Times, Thursday, May 2, 1996, p. 26 .
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would flesh out solutions to these problems us-
ing the new instruments proposed .here.
In practical terms, what is required to suc-
cessfully hedge property catastrophe risks is
the skill to produce and sell a simple product
which is transparent, credible, and can be
priced fairly and traded easily. Experience has
shown that this can be achieved .
From the insurance industry's point of view,
management must ensure that the culture of
its firm encourages the innovation needed to
hedge these risks. The future of the industry
lies with those firms which implement such in-
novation. The companies that adapt successful-
ly will be the ones that survive. In 10 years,
these organizations will draw the map of a
completely restructured reinsurance industry.
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CIRCLES AND CYCLES,
PHASES AND STAGES:
THEIR EFFECT UPON
WORKERS COMPENSATION
FINANCING DECISIONS
by Keith Kakacek, CPA, CPCU, ARM
Self-Insurance Resource. Inc.
Willie Nelson, in his famous ballad, describes
`circles and cycles, phases and stages ." This
wonderful analogy can apply to the workers
compensation risk financing decision process.
Specifically, different approaches become al-
ternatively more or less viable as the market
for workers compensation moves through var-
ious phases .
This article analyzes the way in which changes
in the Texas workers compensation market dur-
ing the past 10 years-triggered by reforms
within the Texas workers compensation sys-
tem-have affected market conditions and there-
fore require risk managers to continually review
their approach to financing this exposure .
Although the article focuses upon Texas, the
concepts it discusses also have broader, nation-
al ramifications. Many of the reforms imple-
mented in Texas during the early 1990s were
adopted in other jurisdictions, as well . Such re-
forms are likely to be adopted in virtually all
states by the end of the decade.
Reforming the Texas Workers
Compensation System
At a seminar more than a decade ago in
1985, Self-Insurance Resource, Inc., forecast-
ed the inevitable implosion of the Texas work-
ers compensation system by 1990. The chart
in Figure 1 at that time graphically demon-
continued on page 8
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ad that the system, as was then constituted,
could not withstand the onslaught of trial at-
torneys -and a workforce that joined forces to
willingly exploit the benefits available in an
uncontested hog trough .
Amazingly, in investigation after investigation,
legislators refused to heed horror stories pre-
sented by Texas employers who witnessed first-
hand their premium dollars being squandered
by a system that fostered no accountability on
the part of key players in that system . It was
only after the Workers' Compensation Assigned
Risk Pool sustained a billion-dollar shortfall and
untold billions of premium dollars were wasted
that the Texas Senate finally passed meaningful
reform legislation .
Rarely has a process yielded such a signifi-
cant outcome as the 1988-1990 review and
legislative overhaul of workers compensation
in Texas. By January 1, 1991, the new law
to
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was in place. It dealt with all aspects of the
system, including the following .
" Governance
	
" Claims handling
" Administration " Insurance market
" Safety " State assigned
" Benefits
Governance
The governance of the system was totally re-
vamped with the creation of the Texas Work-
ers Compensation Commission. This body has
taken a much more active role than what
was provided under the previous system. Spe-
cifically, the Legislative Oversight Committee
and the Sunset Process have focused atten-
tion on the need to prevent workers compen-
sation from threatening the livelihood of the
Texas populace . These two bodies are
charged with reviewing, monitoring, and de-
termining the effectiveness of the system
components.
----------------------------------------
risk pool
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
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